Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 13
Number 3 Spring 1986

Article 3

1-1-1986

Nix v. Whiteside: The Lawyer's Role in Reponse to
Perjury
James R. McCall

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James R. McCall, Nix v. Whiteside: The Lawyer's Role in Reponse to Perjury, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 443 (1986).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol13/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.

ARTICLES
Nix v. Whiteside: The Lawyer's Role In
Response to Perjury
By JAMES R. MCCALL*

Table of Contents
Introduction ...................................................

I.

443

Lawyer Roles and the Nix v. Whiteside Litigation ....

445

A. Confficting Criminal Defense Lawyer Roles ............
B. The Record Facts .....................................
C. The Eighth Circuit Whiteside v. Scurr Decision .........
D. The Eighth Circuit's Decisions on Procedures and
Lawyer Roles .........................................
E. Summary of the Supreme Court Nix Decision ..........

445
448
452

II. The Historical Context of Nix v. Whiteside ..........

459

A.
B.

C.

III.

Lawyers and Subornation of Perjury ...................
Standards of Professional Conduct .....................
1. The ABA Canons of ProfessionalEthics .............
2. The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility .......
3. Proposed CriminalJustice Standard4-Z 7 ...........
4. The Model Rules of ProfessionalConduct ...........
Constitutional Decisions Prior to Nix v. Whiteside ......

The Supreme Court Decision in Nix v. Whiteside ....

A. Opinions of the Court .................................
B. The Four Procedural Issues ............................
Conclusion ......................................................

455
458
460
462
463
465
467
470
471

476
476
482
483

Introduction
Few appellate decisions dealing with lawyers' ethics have captured

the attention of the profession and the general public as did Nix v. White* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1958
Pomona College; J.D. 1962, Harvard Law School.
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side.' The case focused upon a very small portion of the conversation
between a court-appointed criminal defense attorney and his client during a trial preparation conference. Early in the conference, the client
announced the intention to give certain testimony his attorney believed
would be perjurious. The attorney reacted by persuading the defendant
not to give the suspect testimony. Subsequently, the defendant testified
at trial in a manner the attorney considered truthful, and was convicted
of second-degree murder.
The defendant then dismissed his attorney, obtained new counsel
and claimed that his first attorney did not provide the effective assistance
of counsel to which the defendant was constitutionally entitled under the
Sixth Amendment. 2 Over the course of several years the defendant
pressed his claim before all available state and federal courts, culminating in the United States Supreme Court decision of Nix v. Whiteside,
rendered on February 26, 1986.'
As is the case with almost all Supreme Court decisions, the Nix decision addressed issues of constitutional doctrine, three of which are of
major importance. First, what is the proper standard for appellate reversal of a conviction attacked on the ground that the defendant and defense
1. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). The Supreme Court's decision is the last in a series of reported
opinions beginning with the Iowa Supreme Court's affirmance of defendant Whiteside's second-degree murder conviction in State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978). The defendant sought but was denied habeas corpus relief in Whiteside v. Scurr, No. Civil-81-246-C,
slip op., (S.D. Iowa Dec. 7, 1982). The Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court in Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, reh'g denied en banc, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984). The Supreme
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in Nix v. Whiteside. To avoid confusion, this Article will
refer to the Supreme Court opinion as Nix v. Whiteside, or more simply, as Nix, and the
Eighth Circuit panel and en bane hearing opinions will always be referred to as Whiteside v.
Scurr.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy.., the
assistance of Counsel for his defence."). This right was made applicable to state criminal proceedings in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
The standard for evaluating a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claim is found in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The focus of the Strickland text is whether
"[C]ounsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. The defendant must
show that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense.
Strickland stressed that great deference must be given to counsel's performance:
It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission
[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that
of counsel was unreasonable ....
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance
Id. at 689.
3. 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
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counsel disagreed over tactics at the trial? Second, does the defendant in
a criminal action have the right to commit perjury when offering testimony in his or her defense? Third, what obligation does a criminal de4
fense attorney have to participate passively in perjury by the defendant?
The practical significance of the resolution of these issues lies in the
directions given to the organized bar and to the courts that control the
professional behavior of attorneys through promulgation and enforcement of codes or standards of professional conduct. These codes invariably contain both general prohibitions and more detailed procedures that
attorneys representing criminal defendants must follow. Four important
and previously unresolved procedural questions commonly addressed in
codes of attorney conduct are either directly affected by or answered in
Nix. The answers to these procedural questions, which all relate to the
attorney-client relationship, are of great practical significance to defendants in criminal actions, their attorneys, the administration of criminal
justice and the legal profession.
This Article considers the Nix decision analytically and from a historical perspective. Since the decision takes a clear position on some of
the most controversial questions about the attorney-client relationship of
a criminal defense lawyer, the historical context of these issues and the
basic controversy over the proper role of criminal defense attorneys is
explored. This exploration follows a summary of the facts and proceedings involved in the prosecution of Emmanuel Whiteside. In the author's
view, the constitutional issues and the procedural questions relating to
the attorney-client relationship are ultimately determined by the
Supreme Court's conception of the proper role of a defense lawyer in a
criminal case. For this reason, the two competing concepts of the role of
the criminal defense lawyer are discussed, and the court decisions and
professional standards of conduct that embody the two role concepts are
reviewed.
I.
A.

Lawyer Roles and the Nix v. Whiteside Litigation

Conflicting Criminal Defense Lawyer Roles

The decisions on points of consititutional doctrine in Nix are based
upon a clear conception of the proper role for an attorney to assume
when serving as counsel for a citizen accused of a crime. This choice of
the proper role for a lawyer is explicit and consistent in the majority
opinion in Nix, and it should conclude a period of approximately ten
4. The court's position on the three issues is discussed infra in text accompanying notes
141-167.
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years during which there has been no clear professional consensus on the
proper role of the criminal defense attorney. During this period the issue
has produced disarray among appellate courts and in professional ethical
codes, as well as considerable debate among academic lawyers on the
subject. 5
One conception of the proper role for a criminal defense counsel is
that of "officer of the court". Although the duties of such an "officer"
have never been enumerated in detail, standards of professional conduct
and decisions of the Supreme Court contain references to this role.' In
the context of client perjury, one duty of an officer of the court would
seem to be to take all steps necessary to prevent perjury from occurring
in the court and, if perjury has, occurred, to take all steps necessary to
negate its effect.
While the officer of the court role has frequently been mentioned
with approval, it is clear that trial attorneys are advocates for their clients, and this role requires significant loyalty to the client whose cause is
being advocated. If the concept of the advocate role is pushed to an extreme, it can be conceived of as an "alter ego advocate", meaning an
advocate who uses his or her skills in the best interests of, and as directed
by, the client, without consideration for any duties other than to avoid
personally breaking the law. The "alter ego advocate" role is not only
morally defensible, it is seen by its adherents as necessary in order to
adequately secure the rights and liberties of all citizens against government oppression. There is also significant evidence that it is the role that
is in fact actually adopted by many criminal defense attorneys. 7
The most eloquent voice advocating the alter ego advocate role for
criminal defense attorneys has been that of Professor Monroe Freedman.8 Freedman's position on client perjury is both provocative and
5. The conflict in court decisions is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 125-134.
The confusion in the standards of ethics of the legal profession is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 95-112. The academic debate is briefly described infra in text accompanying
notes 8-14.
6. See, eg., A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 4-7.1(a) (1980); see
also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 728-33 (1972) ("The role of a lawyer as an officer of the court
predates the Constitution; it was carried over from the English system and became firmly
embedded in our tradition."); New York ex retL Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 472-73, 162
N.E. 487, 489-90 (1928).
7. See infra note 13.
8. Professor Freedman first published his views on the proper role of a criminal defense
lawyer in Freedman, ProfessionalResponsibility of the CriminalDefense Lawyer: The Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469 (1966) (hereinafter cited as The Three Hardest
Questions). He has restated his views in Freedman, Perjury: The Lawyer's Trilemma, 1 LmGATION 26 (1975) (hereinafter cited as Lawyer's Trilemma), and, finally, in FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) Chapter 3.
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consistent with what he views as the actual and necessary practice of
defense counsel in criminal cases. His position is that an attorney should
put a client who intends to commit perjury on the stand, question the
client in the ordinary manner, and use the perjured testimony as if it
were true evidence for all purposes, including summation argument to
the judge or jury.9 In Professor Freedman's view the conduct he advocates necessarily flows from a trial lawyer's absolute duties of confidentiality and diligence in investigating the facts of a client's case. 10
It should be stressed that the alter ego advocate role does not countenance subornation of perjury or similar forms of law breaking by the
attorney." On the contrary, the alter ego advocate as conceived by
Freedman has a duty to counsel against any unlawful activity, including
perjury.12 However, an explanation of the law of false testimony will
come as no surprise to many defendants in criminal actions, and such
explanation may do little to dissuade a perjury-intending client from doing as he or she intends. Thus, although the alter ego advocate role does
not authorize unlawful conduct on the part of the attorney, it requires
passive participation in the perjury by the attorney if the client maintains
an intent to commit perjury. The alter
ego advocate has no duty to pre13
vent or to report the client's perjury.
9. Lawyer's Trilemma, supra note 8,at 28.
10. Professor Freedman's view of what this author has termed the "alter ego advocate"
role for the criminal defense lawyer has generated voluminous commentary. See, e.g., Dash,
The EmergingRole andFunctionof the CriminalDefense Lawyer, 47 N.C.L. REv. 598, 630-32
(1969); Selinger, The PerryMason Perspective and Others: A Critiqueof ReductionistThinking
About the Ethics of Untruthful Practicesby Lawyersfor "Innocent" Defendants, 6 HoFSRA L.
REV.631 (1978); and Lefstein, The CriminalDefendant Who ProposesPerjury: Rethinking the
Defense Lawyer's Dilemma, 6 HoFsTRA L. REV. 665 (1978).
11. Subornation of perjury has historically involved active inducement of the perjury
which goes beyond merely asking the questions that produce the perjured testimony from the
witness. See infra text accompanying notes 69-76. Professor Freedman has indicated that his
alter ego advocate conception of the criminal defense attorney would not permit an attorney to
passively participate in perjury by witnesses other than the defendant and perhaps the defendant's spouse or parent. Lawyer's Trilemma, supra note 8, at 28.
12. It would appear that between 1966 and 1975, Professor Freedman somewhat altered
his position on the question of an attorney's duty to attempt to dissuade the perjury-intending
client. In 1966, Professor Freedman explicitly asserted a duty on the part of the criminal
defense attorney to attempt to persuade the client to abandon the intent to commit perjury.
See The Three Hardest Questions, supra note 8, at 1478 n.3. However, in 1975 Professor
Freedman was less concerned with actively dissuading the testimony: "In my opinion, the
attorney's obligation in such a situation would be to advise the client that the proposed testimony is unlawful, but to proceed in the normal fashion in presenting the testimony and arguing the case to the jury if the client makes the decision to go forward." The Lawyer's
Trilemma, supra note 8, at 28.
13. Regardless of one's view of the merits of the alter ego advocate position, it is impossible not to be impressed with the value of Professor Freedman's contribution to the debate over
the proper role of a criminal defense attorney by articulating his choice for that role in the
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In contrast, the officer of the court role for a criminal defense attorney includes, at a minimum, a duty to prevent perjury from occurring in
a court proceeding if the acts of prevention sacrifice no lawful interest of
the client. This minimum duty of a court officer would call for strong
attempts to dissuade the client from committing perjury. Beyond this, it
can be argued that a court officer should have an obligation to prevent
perjury by a number of additional procedures, ranging from withdrawal
from representation through non-participation in the giving of any false
testimony, to reporting a client's perjury or intended perjury to the court
or prosecutorial authorities. The academic figure most frequently associated with the officer of the court role in relation to client perjury is Professor Charles Wolfram. The association was formed by the publication
in 1977 of Professor Wolfram's comprehensive and much cited article on
the subject of client perjury. The article, among many things, flatly rejected Professor Freedman's position on the proper response of a criminal defense lawyer to intended client perjury.14
Although the proper lawyer role concept may seem a rather academic topic, the choice between the two competing concepts has great
practical significance. The various courts that reviewed the prosecution
of Clarence Whiteside made, sub silentio, conflicting choices on the
proper role conception of a criminal defense lawyer, and from those
choices flowed conflicting decisions on the validity of the judgment in the
case.
B. The Record Facts
The basic facts regarding the killing of Calvin Love were never in
substantial dispute. 5 In the early morning of February 8, 1977, Emmanuel Whiteside and two companions, Derrick Doolin and Terry Fowler,
academic literature. His contribution, it should be noted, is not only controversial but was
made at not a little cost to him personally in time and tribulation. Professor Freedman reports
that several members of the Washington D.C. bar urged that he be suspended or disbarred for
his views. After four months of proceedings, the charges were dropped. See The Three Hardest Questions, supra note 8,at 1469 n.l. In addition, it is Professor Freedman's view, and this
author has no reason to doubt him on the point, that many practitioners conduct their defense
of defendants in criminal actions in accordance with the dictates of the alter ego advocate role
model. See Lefstein, supra note 10, at 675 n.33 for discussion of statistical surveys supporting
Professor Freedman on this point.
14. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. Rlv. 809, 848, 853 (1977). Professor Wolfram
argues that reporting of (the proposed) pejury of the client to the court is "[t]he only workable
approach." Id. at 853.
15. The following description draws from the Eighth Circuit opinion, 744 F.2d 1323, the
Supreme Court opinion, 106 S.Ct. 988 and the trial record found at Appendix to Petition for
Writ of Certiorari, Nix v. Whiteside, 105 S.Ct. 2016 (1985) (as reported in 23 AM CRIM. L.
REV. 2 n.17 (1986)) (hereinafter cited as Writ of Cert. Petition).
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went to Love's apartment. Their intention was to claim as their own a
quantity of marijuana held by Love. At the apartment, they found Love
in the company of his girlfriend, Kathy Sauer. An argument over who
had the right to the marijuana ensued. Love became particularly incensed at Doolin and also appeared to threaten Whiteside, when the latter attempted to intervene. Love asked Sauer to get his "piece"-street
argot for pistol-and reached toward the pillow on his bed. At that
point Whiteside fatally stabbed Love. The time was approximately 2:00
A.M.
Love had a reputation as a belligerent, gun-owning ex-convict.
Whiteside had been in jail with Love in the past and thought the latter a
dangerous character. Whiteside at all times maintained that he was in
fear of his life at the time he stabbed Love, and he so testified at the trial.
Although the state charged Whiteside with first degree murder, the jury
chose to convict him of the lesser charge of murder in the second degree.
The trial court judge sentenced Whiteside to forty years imprisonment.
While the jury was deliberating, Whiteside responded to a question
from the Judge by stating that he was satisfied with the representation in
the case he had received from his attorneys, Gary Robinson and Robinson's assistant, Donna Paulson. Following the verdict, Whiteside, represented by new counsel, moved for a new trial on the ground, among
others, that he had not received effective assistance from Robinson.16
At the hearing on the motion, Whiteside testified that he had given
Robinson a written statement when the latter had been appointed to be
his counsel. The statement contained the sentence that Love had
reached under his pillow and pulled a pistol out from under it just before
Whiteside stabbed him to death. Whiteside testified that he continued to
talk to Robinson about the need for Robinson to find the pistol so that it
could be produced at trial during the weeks between Robinson's appointment and the commencement of the trial.
Whiteside was somewhat vague in his testimony concerning a crucial conference with Robinson some ten days before trial. At that conference both Robinson and Paulson were present, and Whiteside revealed
his intention to them that he would testify that he had seen a gun in
Love's hand just before he had, in self-defense, stabbed Love. 7
16. Paulson, who functioned as Robinson's assistant during trial preparation and at trial,
did not have a significant role in any of the events that are relevant to the issues raised by
Whiteside's claim that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. However, she did
testify concerning the conferences at which she was present, including the conference some ten
days before trial that is of crucial importance in considering Whiteside's claim. Cf infra text
accompanying note 24.
17. Writ of Cert. Petition, supra note 15, at A.70-72.
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Although Whiteside had no specific recollection of Robinson's response,
the defendant did recall that he "got the impression" that if he testified
that he had seen a gun in Love's hand prior to the stabbing, Robinson
would back out of the representation. It was because of this impression
that Whiteside elected not to state in his testimony that he had seen a
gun in Love's hand. Whiteside could remember no other threats or admonitions that Robinson had made during the conference.
Robinson's testimony gave a more complete, and significantly different, narrative of the events in question. Robinson recalled that he had
been appointed by the court to represent Whiteside only after the latter
had been unable to obtain the court appointment of the attorney of his
choice.' 8 Before Robinson, another attorney was appointed by the court
for Whiteside. Whiteside rejected this appointee, however, because the
attorney had previously worked as a County Prosecutor and the defendant felt unable to trust him. The trial court then appointed Gary Robinson to represent Whiteside.
Robinson recalled the first conference he had with Whiteside and
that the latter had given him a five page personal statement describing
the killing. Whiteside had written in the statement that he had seen a
pistol in Love's hand just prior to stabbing him. 9 The written statement
had been prepared by Whiteside for his first attorney, and Robinson's
impression was that his client had not been serious about seeing a pistol
in Love's hand when he wrote the statement. Robinson thereafter
searched Love's apartment for between 30 to 45 minutes, but found no
pistol.2 0 He questioned the three witnesses to the killing, Doolin, Fowler,
and Sauer. All of them said that Love had not reached for a pistol prior
to the killing and that they had seen no pistol in the room at any time
during the incident. Robinson questioned the police officer who arrived
at the crime scene within fifteen minutes after the killing and who immediately searched the premises. That officer had found no pistol or other
18. The attorney that Whiteside wished to have represent him was Thomas Koehler. After Koehler had held several conferences with Whiteside and had begun work on the case, a
conflict of interest developed in the sense that one of the attorneys working in Koehler's office
was appointed counsel for codefendant Doolin. Writ of Cert. Petition, supra note 15, at A.4648. Under Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, if an
attorney would be disqualified from representing two clients at the same time, the two clients
cannot be represented by any two attorneys in the same law office, and one of the two clients
must seek an attorney in a different law firm. Defendants Whiteside and Doolin could reasonably be predicted to have a conflict of interest at some time in the proceeding, and the existence
of a potential conflict has been held sufficient to trigger disqualification. See Cinema Five, Ltd.
v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976) (establishing that the law of disqualification of
counsel will follow the same principle as DR 5-105(D)).
19. See Writ. of Cert Petition, supra note 15, at A.76-78.
20. Id. at A.80.
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weapon at the scene.2 1 On the basis of these investigations and searches,
Robinson concluded that there was no gun in the apartment and that
Love neither had a gun in his hand nor had been reaching for one when
Whiteside stabbed him.22 This conclusion was supported, in Robinson's
mind, by the fact that during his twenty-three conferences with Whiteside over the sixty-nine day period between his appointment and the trial,
Whiteside did not mention the prospect of testifying that he had seen a
gun in Love's hand until the conference, at which Paulson was also present, approximately ten days before trial.2 3
The purpose of the conference was to discuss a recently offered plea
bargain and to review Whiteside's testimony. As Robinson recalled it,
during the conference Whiteside for the first time mentioned to either
Robinson or Paulson that he had seen something "metallic" in Love's
hand just before stabbing him. When Paulson asked Whiteside about the
alteration in his testimony, Whiteside expressed concern that the success
of his self-defense claim depended on the jury believing Love had had a
pistol. He mentioned that in the successful defense of an acquaintance's
"case there was a gun. If I don't say I saw a gun I'm dead." 2 4
Robinson testified that he responded by explaining, as he had previously, that it was not necessary that Love actually had a gun in his hand
in order for a self-defense claim to be recognized; it was only necessary
that Whiteside believed that Love had a gun and was in the act of reaching for it. Robinson further explained that for Whiteside to testify that
he had seen a gun would be perjury, since Whiteside had not mentioned
seeing a gun before this, and was seeking to change his story now only
out of a mistaken view of the requirements for a self-defense claim.
Robinson further recalled telling Whiteside that neither he nor Paulson,
as officers of the court, could ask a client a question on the witness stand
with the expectation that the client would answer falsely. If Whiteside
persisted in his intention to testify falsely, Robinson told him that his
attorneys would seek to withdraw, and if Whiteside testified as per his
expressed intention, his attorneys would be duty-bound to tell the judge
that they believed their client was committing perjury. Robinson testified that he gave a final warning to Whiteside to dissuade his client from
perjury-if the intended perjury was committed he "would probably be
allowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony. '2' According
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at A.82.
Id. at A.78.
Id. at A.77.
Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct at 991.
See Writ of Cert. Petition, supra note 15, at A.85, A.87.
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to Robinson, Whiteside never again mentioned seeing a gun or anything
metallic in Love's hand prior to the stabbing.2 6
During the defendant's testimony at trial, Robinson asked Whiteside if he thought that Love had a gun at the time he stabbed him, but
Robinson did not ask his client if he saw a gun or anything in Love's
hand. On cross-examination, Whiteside was asked if he had seen a gun
at the time of the stabbing, and he answered that he had not. In Robinson's opinion, the defendant's decision not to testify that he had seen a
gun was the result of Robinson's warning that he would inform the judge
of his belief that such testimony was perjurious, if it was given on the
stand.2 7
The trial court believed the testimony of Robinson, which was corroborated by testimony from Paulson, that there had been no ineffective
assistance of counsel. 28 The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the record of
the trial and the hearing on the mistrial motion and held that there had
been no error or deprivation of Whiteside's constitutional rights. The
opinion of the court commended both Robinson and Paulson
"for the
29
high ethical manner in which this matter was handled.1
Approximately three years later, Whiteside sought a writ of habeas
corpus from a federal district court on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. In a short opinion, the District Court stated that a defendant has no right to the assistance of counsel in committing perjury
and denied the writ.3 ° Whiteside appealed the ruling to the Eighth
Circuit.
C. The Eighth Circuit Whiteside v. Scurr Decision
The Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court and ordered that the
writ of habeas corpus be granted in Whiteside v. Scur. 31 Although there
had been no dissent from the initial opinion, the circuit was sharply divided in reaching a decision to deny a petition for rehearing en banc. In
its opinion, the court summarized the pertinent facts, stating that Robinson had "threatened" to withdraw, inform the court and testify against
the defendant in the event that Whiteside did not change his intention to
26. Id. at A.89.
27. Id. at A.88-89.
28. Nix, 106 S.Ct. at 992.
29. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978).
30. Whiteside v. Scurr, No. Civil-81-246-C, slip op. (S.D. Iowa Dec. 7, 1982).
31. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir.), reh'g denied, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. grantedsub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 105 S.Ct. 2016 (1985). As stated supra note 1,
the Supreme Court opinion will be referred to as "Nix"; the Eighth Circuit opinions as
"Whiteside v. Scurr".
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testify that he had seen something metallic in Love's hand immediately
before the stabbing. While the Eighth Circuit might perceive Robinson's warnings as threats, counsel for Scurr, the warden of Whiteside's
prison, chose to characterize Robinson's words on these points as
"admonitions"."
The court complimented Robinson for his efforts to act in accordance with the accepted ethics of the legal profession. However, the
court's analysis of the issues began by noting that, while Robinson's actions may have been in part required by the guidelines of the bar, such
guidelines are not superior to the dictates of the United States Constitution. 33 According to the Eighth Circuit, two of Whiteside's constitutional rights were deemed abridged by Robinson's conduct. The first was
the right to effective assistance of counsel in meeting a criminal prosecution. The second was the right implicitly contained in the Due Process
Clause to testify in his own defense. 34 Whiteside was entitled to protection of these rights despite the fact that the court specifically accepted the
lower court finding of fact that Robinson was correct in his opinion that
Whiteside "would have testified falsely", or "would have committed perjury" but for Robinson's admonition-threats.3 5
Regarding the effectiveness of Robinson's representation, the court
stated that his actions, "in particular the threat to testify against [Whiteside], indicate that a conflict of interest had developed.",36 Even though
this conflict was over the client's admitted intent to commit perjury,
counsel had thereby "become a potential adversary and ceased to serve as
32. Compare Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1329 ("Counsel's actions, in particular the
threat to testify against appellant, indicate that a conflict of interest had developed."); Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d at 714 (denying rehearing) ("The lawyer who discloses confidential
communications or who threatensto do so. . .has become an adversary to the interests of his
or her Client.") (emphasis added); with Appel and McGrane, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perury
and the Criminal JusticeSystem: The State's Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 40 ("The
only impact of the admonitions. . . was the defeat of the proposed perjury plan.") (emphasis
added). Also note the view of Fagg, J. dissenting from the Circuit's denial of a rehearing
petition: "[T]he panel analyzed the lawyer's strongly worded admonition from a theoretical
viewpoint without taking into account what actually happened." 750 F.2d at 718 (emphasis
added).
33. Whiteside v. Scurr at 1327-28. Later the court notes that Robinson's statement that
he would testify against Whiteside is not specifically required or even authorized by the American Bar Association's Model Rules or Standards for the Admin. of Criminal Justice. Id. at
1331. In point of fact, Robinson's duties under the professional guidelines available to him
were fragmentary at the time Whiteside informed him of his intention to commit perjury. The
only clear prohibitions were those against the knowing use of perjured testimony and against
counseling or assisting in illegal conduct. IowA P.R. CODE 7-102(A)(4) and (7).
34. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1329.
35. Id. at 1328.
36. Id. at 1329.
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a zealous advocate of [Whiteside's] interests."37 Because he had become
a "potential adversary", Robinson could not render effective assistance of
counsel as required by the Sixth Amendment.38
As a separate ground for granting the writ of habeas corpus, the
court recognized a right of a defendant in a criminal trial to testify in his
or her own behalf. This right was seen as implicit in the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and in the more specific rights to meet accusations and present witnesses included in the Sixth Amendment.39
According to the Eighth Circuit, Whiteside's constitutional right to testify became "impermissably compromised" when Robinson conditioned
continued representation and confidentiality upon Whiteside's giving
only "restricted" testimony." It is clear from the court's language that
"restricted" testimony is testimony which omits perjured statements the
client would like to give.
In reversing the District Court, the Eighth Circuit adopted the reversible error standard recently established by the United States Supreme
Court in Strickland v. Washington.4 1 The Strickland standard generally
requires an appellant to show that but for the acts showing the ineffective
assistance of counsel, "the result of the proceeding would have been different."'42 However, the court decided not to demonstrate how that general standard was met in the case before it, because it believed an
exception to the general standard was applicable.
The exception recognized in Strickland applied to a convicted defendant whose trial attorney was also representing a second client whose
legal interests actively conflicted with the defendant's. In an appeal in
such cases, the defendant-appellant was held entitled to a limited presumption of prejudice without the specific proof usually required. In the
opinion of the court, Robinson's "threat to testify" against Whiteside in
the event of the latter's commission of the crime of perjury constituted a
"breach of loyalty" against the client. This and the other "threats" made
by Robinson served to "undermine the fundamental trust between lawyer
and client."'4 3 For this reason, the court held that Robinson's actions
were tantamount to active representation of a second client with legal
interests conflicting with those of Whiteside. Therefore, the Eighth Cir37. Id.
38. Id. at 1331.
39. Id. at 1329-30.
40. Id. at 1329.
41. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
42. Id. at 694; see also, supra note 2.
43. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1330; see also, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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cuit held that prejudice requiring a reversal should be conclusively
presumed. 44
The motion for a rehearing produced four opinions and a substantially sharper discussion of the issues. 45 The opinions denying the petition for rehearing strongly asserted that the court's panel opinion had
not created or recognized a constitutional right on the part of Whiteside
to commit perjury. They stressed that the basis for the decision was simply that Robinson had threatened to testify adversely to his client, and
thereby became an ineffective counsel. This act denied Whiteside the
right to testify as he wished, and a presumption of reversible prejudice
was established because Robinson's act created a serious "conflict of interest" between client and counsel.4 6
The two dissents argued vigorously that no presumptively prejudicial conflict under the Strickland precedent arose when counsel simply
informed his client of the possible adverse consequences of the client's
intended course of illegal conduct. Further, the dissents found no evidence of actual prejudice to Whiteside in Robinson's conduct of the trial.
Finally, the dissenters asserted that persuading a client not to commit the
crime of perjury, even by "strident" means, should never be considered
"inadequate" assistance of counsel, given the duty of the lawyer "as an
officer of the court to protect the integrity of our Nation's courts."'4 7
D. The Eighth Circuit's Decisions on Procedures and Lawyer Roles
The Eighth Circuit opinion made a silent, but clear, decision about
the proper role of a criminal defense lawyer. The role endorsed by the
court was clearly that of an alter ego advocate, whose duty of loyalty to
the client's purposes and sense of autonomy is such that the attorney
ceases to function as an independent participant in the formal or public
process of criminal justice adjudication. In short, there was no room, in
the Eighth Circuit's view, for a criminal defense lawyer to assume the
role of an officer of the court when dealing with a client with a firm
intention to commit perjury.
While it may seem too strong to state the Eighth Circuit's model of
a properly functioning criminal defense lawyer in such terms, it is the
only explanation for the specific rulings of the court. Most pointedly,
only the fact that the opinion was premised on the concept of the alter
44. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1330.
45. Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1984) (denying rehearing ) (Fagg, J.,
dissenting).
46. Id. at 714, 717 (Lay, J. concurring).
47. Id. at 714-16, 717-19. The quoted phrase appears id. at 718 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
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ego advocate role can explain the court's holding that Robinson, by attempting to dissuade Whiteside from committing perjury, created a conflict as detrimental to the client's interest as would be the case if
Robinson represented two criminal defendants with directly conflicting
interests in the same trial.
If an attorney's professional obligations to the court and personal
desires to avoid becoming passively embroiled in criminal activity cannot
be honored without invariably prejudicing the rights of the client, the
attorney's obligations and desires are meaningless-he or she must act
only to advance the interests of the client in ways that are to be controlled by the client. This dramatic choice of role provides a framework
for considering the ethics of trial attorney conduct, and is unmistakably
indicated by the court's doctrinal determination on the issue of "conflict"
in regard to the proper standard for reversal. Not surprisingly, the "conflict" determination was the most controversial and vulnerable aspect of
the Eighth Circuit's decision.4 8
Whiteside v. Scurr raised four major questions of procedure relating
to the criminal defense attorney-client relationship. The courts and the
profession have been increasingly concerned with these questions, all of
which are of great significance in both the administration of criminal justice and the ethics of the legal profession. The Eighth Circuit decision
and the Nix v. Whiteside decision which reversed it, significantly advance
the debate on the four questions and provide a partial resolution of
them. 49
The first question is when does a criminal defense attorney "know"
his client intends to commit perjury and thus have a duty to take some
type of action to stop client perjury. The second question evolves from
the accepted premise that when an attorney knows that his or her client
will commit perjury, the attorney has a duty to attempt to dissuade the
client from doing so. The question that is naturally presented is what
type of admonitions can be used by an attorney to dissuade his client.
The third question also evolves from a widely accepted premisethat an attorney should withdraw from representation of a client who
cannot be persuaded to abandon an intention to commit perjury. The
unanswered question is what should the attorney do if he or she cannot
withdraw from representing the client who intends to give perjurious tes48. Indeed, not one member of the United States Supreme Court agreed with the Eighth
Circuit on this point. See infra text accompanying notes 142-143.
49. The professional and court consideration of the issues is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 78-108. The treatment of the specific issues in the Nix decision is discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 168-181.
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timony. This question must be answered carefully, especially if the attorney, whose request for withdrawal is denied, will thereby be required to
represent the client at the trial at which the client intends to commit the
perjury. The fourth, and final, question is what should a lawyer do in the
event his or her client commits perjury. This question applies with equal,
or at least substantial, force to the attorney who learns of the client's
intent to commit perjury and successfully withdraws from representation
before the client testifies. To take into account the withdrawn attorney
situation, the issue should be phrased as: what are the duties of an attorney who knows that his or her present or former client has committed
perjury?
On the first question, the Eighth Circuit accepted the finding of the
trial court that Robinson was correct in his belief that Whiteside intended to commit perjury." This finding, which does not provide significant guidance for the profession, was affirmed and slightly expanded
upon by the Supreme Court in Nix.5 On the second procedural question, 9hiteside v. Scurr expressly held that no threat to report the client's
intended perjury can be made by counsel in response to the announcement of that intent, and the decision contains language indicating that it
is improper to admonish the client that the lawyer will withdraw unless
the client changes his intention. 2
On the third and fourth questions, concerning attorney conduct during continued representation and duty to report perjury, Whiteside v.
Scurr implies definite answers. Because the court held that a defendant's
right to testify requires defense counsel take no action that "restricts" the
client's giving of perjury, logic would require the criminal defense attorney to treat perjured testimony as if it were true and take no steps to
Otherwise, the attorney's
report perjury by a present or a former client. 53
perjury.
the
of
value
the
restrict
actions would
50. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1328; id. at 714 (denying rehearing).
51. 106 S. Ct. at 997. The determinations on these points by the United States Supreme
Court is one of the main subjects addressed infra in text accompanying notes 153-156.
52. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d at 1329; id. at 717 (denying rehearing) (Lay, J.,
concurring).
53. The views of the Supreme Court on the second, third, and fourth procedural issues are
contrary to those of the Eighth Circuit. See infra notes 168-181 and accompanying text. It
should be noted that four of the Justices who participated in the Nix decision objected to the
implications in the majority opinion that particular responses on the part of a criminal defense
attorney to intended or actual client pejury should be recommended by the United States
Supreme Court. The majority's position is clearly that it is proper for the Court to recommend
such procedures. See infra text accompanying notes 157-166.
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Summary of the Supreme Court Nix Decision

The decision of the United States Supreme Court contained two
elaborate opinions: the majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger
and joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor, and Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. 54 Neither opinion specifically addresses the
issue of what is the proper role of a criminal defense attorney, although
both indicate the role that the authors deem proper. On the four procedural questions, both opinions, particularly the majority, are informative.
The nine Justices agreed that the Eighth Circuit erred in finding that
Whiteside's constitutionally protected rights were prejudiced as a result
of Robinson's representation. Thus the lower court decision was reversed unanimously and the writ of habeas corpus denied. However, the
Court split sharply over the propriety of deciding whether an attorney
should report a client's perjury to the court." The Court's discussion
and resolution of the reporting of perjury question is rich in implication.
On the first procedural question, the Court does not offer general
guidance to the Bar on when an attorney "knows" that a client intends to
commit perjury.56 Regarding the second and third procedural questions,
the Court's approval of Robinson's conduct clearly establishes that the
admonitions that attorneys can use to dissuade a perjury-intending client
include dramatic and startling threats to report the intended perjury if it
does occur and to take the stand as an impeachment witness in certain
situations.5 7 If the client cannot be dissuaded by admonitions to abandon intended perjury, withdrawal is appropriate. Furthermore, a passage in the majority opinion can easily be read to mean that even more
drastic action on the part of defense counsel to avoid perjury is consistent
with the obligation of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment." The concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun indicates
general agreement with the majority on these points, but the express and
54. Both Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens wrote very short separate statements, but
both concurred in the views expressed by Justice Blackmun's concurrence. The various opinions of the Court are discussed in more detail infra in text accompanying notes 135-181.
55. See infra notes 151-163 and accompanying text.
56. See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
57. See full discussion infra in text accompanying notes 151-166.
58. See 106 S. Ct. at 996 n.6. In this note, the Court mentions, without disapproval, the
view of "most courts" which insist on a "more rigorous" approach to prospective client perjury. The cited cases specifically approve an attorney's: (1) refusal to let a perjury-intending
client take the stand (United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984)); (2) reporting
anticipated perjury to the trial court (McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir.
1967), affid after remand, 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968)); and (3) disbarment for knowingly
using false testimony (Dodd v. The Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1969)).
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implied reservations of the four members of the Court who signed the
concurrence are significant.5 9
On the final procedural question of what should an attorney do if a
present or past client commits perjury, the majority announced that reporting to the court is consistent with effective assistance of counsel. The
firmness of the majority's announcement perhaps indicates a view that
reporting should be required, although, as pointed out by the concurrence, there is no constitutional right or duty that presently would require such reporting.6 0
The majority also states that an attorney for a criminal defendant
can, after withdrawal, testify to impeach the testimony given by the former client.6" The concurring Justices, with the possible exception of Stevens, refused to state their views on this issue, because reversal in the
case was warranted on the ground that Whiteside was not prejudiced by
Robinson's activities.
The foregoing summary provides guidance to the important procedural questions that courts and bar associations have addressed in the
past. It is to the body of law on these issues that we now turn.
II.

The Historical Context of Nix v. Whiteside

Considering the potential for perjury in any lawsuit and the undeniable incentive for self-protective perjury on the part of a guilty defendant
in a criminal action, it is surprising to find relatively few decisions that
address the issues involved in Nix. Defendant perjury in criminal actions
and the question of the attorney's proper response to it have led other
62
legal systems to adopt dramatic changes in the usual structure of trials.
Thus, in most civil law countries the defendant in a criminal action is not
sworn to tell the truth before testifying, and is entitled to give an un59. See the discussion of these points of reservation infra in text accompanying notes 161166.
60. The position of Justice Brennan in his separate statement and the other Justices that
subscribe to the concurrence is adamant on the point that any question of what a criminal
defense lawyer should be required to do is a matter of state law. Furthermore, they consider it
improper for the majority to express opinions on such duties. See infra text accompanying
notes 165-166.
61. See 106 S. Ct. at 997 n.7 (concluding that Robinson's threat (if it was that) to testify
against Whiteside meant only that Robinson would so testify if Whiteside perjured himself
after Robinson withdrew as his attorney). The Court concludes, sub silentio, that the record
read in this fashion discloses no Sixth Amendment question worth mentioning.
62. R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW - CAsEs, TEXT AND MATERIALS 451-55
(4th ed. 1980).
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sworn statement of his or her version of facts relevant to the case.6 3
Due to the expectation of defendant perjury, English and American
courts until the late nineteenth century held, as a matter of law, that
defendants were not credible witnesses in criminal cases. 64 The Canadian Bar Association has recognized the problem by requiring that criminal defense attorneys inform their clients at the start of the attorneyclient relationship that admissions to the attorney may limit the type of
defense that the attorney can provide to the client.6 5
In the United States there has been very little judicial treatment of
the subject, but over the years, the organized bar and academic commentators have addressed the problem. As will be seen, these approaches
have generally been inconsistent and have disagreed on the proper role
and function of a criminal defense attorney.
A.

Lawyers and Subornation of Perjury

Perjury, the giving of known false testimony or evidence in a judicial
proceeding under oath, has been a statutory crime in England since at
least 1563.66 At the time of Blackstone the crime was punishable by fine
or imprisonment with an automatic prohibition against giving testimony
in any future proceeding.6 7 In this country, the crime of perjury is a felony under federal law and under the statutes of almost all states.68 The
closely allied crime of subornation of perjury, is also usually designated
as a felony under state statutes.6 9
63. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFFALO L. REv. 361, 367 (1977); see also United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556,
578, 587-92 (Frank, J., dissenting in part); id. at 587-92 (Appendix II) (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd 353
U.S. 391 (1957).
64. See Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. at 993. This historical legacy at least partially explains why the question of whether defendants in criminal actions have a constitutionally protected right to testify still remains open. Id. at 993-94.
65. Lefstein, supra note 10, at 688 n.96.
66. Gordon, The Invention of a Common Law Crime: Peruryand the ElizabethanCourts,
24 THE AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST. 145, 145-46 (1980).

67. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 510-13 (3d ed. 1982) (citing

BLACKSTONE,

4 BLACK-

STONE'S COMMENTARIES 137-38).

68. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1985) (perjury punishable by fine up to $2000 and imprisonment of
five years; e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 126 (Deering 1983); see also PERKINS, supranote 67, at 513.
69. While most states prohibit subornation of perjury under a specific statute, others
merely authorize prosecution of the crime under the general statute prohibiting solicitation to
commit a crime. An example of the specific statute approach, California Penal Code § 127
provides: "Every person who willfully procures another person to commit pejury is guilty of
subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he would be if personally
guilty of the perjury so procured." New York, on the other hand, has prosecuted subornation
of perjury under Penal Code § 100.05, which generally prohibits criminal solicitation. People
v. Luft, 259 App. Div. 222, 18 N.Y.S.2d 880 (1940).
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There are very few reported decisions holding attorneys guilty of the
charge of subornation of perjury.7 ° The subornation issue relevant to
Nix concerns the criminal liability of an attorney who does not actively
procure perjured testimony, but who merely questions a witness knowing
that the testimony he or she is asking for will be perjurious.7 1 Commentators and courts apparently agree that the attorney who asks questions
of a witness knowing that perjury will result could be successfully prosecuted for subornation of perjury. 72 However, even though the United
States Supreme Court agrees with the possibilty of applying a subornation statute to a "passive" attorney, no cases in which such an attorney
has actually been so prosecuted can be found.7 3
State standards of professional conduct specifically forbid attorneys
to use or offer testimony or evidence to a court that is known by the
attorney to be false.7 4 The standards are enforced by sanctions such as
suspension or disbarment from practice, and the sanctions are imposed
either through court actions or by administrative tribunals with court
review available to the disciplined attorney. As might be expected, there
are many reported cases involving substantial sanctions against lawyers
who took an active role in either the production of false evidence or the
procurement of false testimony. 7 However, as with the pattern of perjury prosecutions, there are very few reported decisions in which disciplinary sanctions have been levied against an attorney who did nothing
more than conduct an examination that elicited perjury, and did not report the perjury to the court. Invariably, reported disciplinary actions
70. Wolfram, supra note 14, at 818-19 (1977); Porter, Lying Clientsand Legal Ethics: The
Attorney's Unsolved Dilemma, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 487 n.3 (1983).
71. People v. Jones, 254 Cal. App. 2d 200, 217-18, 62 Cal. Rptr. 304, 315-16 (1967).
72. In re Branch, 70 Cal. 2d 200, 210-11, 449 P.2d 174, 181,74 Cal. Rptr. 238, 245 (1969)
("An attorney who attempts to benefit his client through the use of perjured testimony may be
subject to criminal prosecution .... "); People v. Davis, 48 Cal.2d 241, 257, 309 P.2d 1, 10
(1957) ("Counsel may not offer the testimony of a witness which he knows to be untrue. To do
so may consitute subornation of perjury."). See Wolfram, supra note 14, at 816-17.
73. The United States Supreme Court clearly indicates its view of the possibility in Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976) and in Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 996. In researching the
matter, Professor Porter found no reported prosecutions of "passive" attorneys, who with
knowledge asked the perjury eliciting questions. Porter, supra note 70, at 487 n.3.
74. The history of the American Bar Association standards of professional conduct,
which have been adopted in almost every state for the purpose of controlling the legal profession, is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 78-112.
75. Three frequently cited decisions of this type are Dodd v. The Florida Bar, 118 So. 2d
17, 19 (Fla. 1960) ("No breach of professional ethics, or of the law, is more harmful to the
administration ofjustice or more hurtful to the public appraisal of the legal profession than the
knowlegeable use by an attorney of false testimony in the judicial process. When it is done it
deserves the harshest penalty."); Iowa Bar v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976); and In re
Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951).
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involving perjury concern attorneys who took an active role in inducing
the perjury.7 6
There are at least three possible reasons for the scarcity of reported
prosecutions or disciplinary actions involving passive attorney conduct in
the form of merely asking questions that elicited perjurious testimony.
First, often the most important testimony in such a proceeding must
come from an admitted perjurer, which is hardly the type of evidence a
prosecutor or state bar attorney wants to use as the basis for prosecuting
a case. Second, there has been considerable concern in recent years over
the constitutionality of an attorney's refusal to "put on the client and let

him tell his (or her) story", a concern that has to some degree been laid
to rest by the Nix decision. Finally, unless the accused attorney's client
in the action in which the perjury occurred cooperates with the prosecuting authorities, the attorney-client privilege can pose great problems in
gathering and presenting the necessary evidence to prove that subornation of perjury-or the perjury itself-has occurred."
B.

Standards of Professional Conduct

The legal profession's conception of the proper role of the litigating
attorney has changed over the years, as can be seen by reviewing the
standards of conduct adopted by the national organization of the profession. The officer of the court role was accepted until the mid-1970s, at
which time the prevailing view shifted to an alter ego advocate role con76. Divorce litigation has generated a disproportionate share of such disciplinary actions,
and the client perjury involved usually relates to rather technical matters such as residency. In
such matters it is highly likely that the attorney took a more active role than merely asking the
questions that elicited the perjury. See, eg., Florida Bar v. Agar, 394 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 1980);
and In re Grimes, 326 N.W.2d 380 (Mich. 1982). The California decision ofIn re Jones, 208
Cal. 240, 280 P. 964 (1929) is often cited by courts in and outside of California for the proposition that passive attorney conduct in regards to client perjury can subject the attorney to sanctions. However, the allegations and facts in the case involved active procurement of perjurious
testimony by the attorney involved as well as merely passive conduct, and the appellate court's
findings of fact are somewhat ambiguous. 208 Cal. at 243, 280 P. at 965. In re Palmer, 252
S.E.2d 784 (N.C. 1979), appears to be one of the few clear passive attorney conduct cases in
which discipline was imposed. The attorney failed to withdraw when it was clear that the
client intended to commit perjury on the stand. On the other hand, in In re Malloy, 248
N.W.2d 43 (N.D. 1976), the court dismissed a disciplinary complaint against an attorney who
did no more than fail to withdraw from representation upon the surprise perjury of a client in a
deposition.
77. See, e.g., proposed FED. R. EvID. 503, which is considered an accurate statement of
the attorney-client privilege. Proposed Rule 503 provides, in pertinent part:
...A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services to the client ... [but t]here is no privilege
under this rule... [i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or
aid anyone to commit.., a crime or fraud ....
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cept. The most recent professional standards appear to have been
drafted with a compromise role for the lawyer in mind.
L

The ABA Canons of ProfessionalEthics

In 1908 the American Bar Association promulgated its Canons of
Professional Ethics. For sixty-two years the Canons, as the standards
soon came to be known, formed the basis for lawyer discipline throughout the United States.7" Prior to 1908, a number of academics and practicing attorneys had expressed personal views on lawyer ethics in books
and articles, but the ABA Canons represented the first successful effort
by a national professional association of attorneys to set out a consensus
view on matters of professional responsibility. 79 The predecessors to the
Canons generally were in accord with traditional views of legal professionalism, prohibiting such gambits as counsel's expression of belief in
the client's case. 8° However, the nineteenth century codes were silent on
the procedural questions involved in Nix. Thus, it is somewhat surprising
to find that the Canons were rather direct in furnishing guidance on three
of the four procedural questions involved in the Whiteside v. Scurr and
Nix decisions.
Canon Five specifically concerned the duties of a defense attorney in
a criminal case, but it offered little more than the statement that an attorney "is bound by all fair and honorable means, to present every defense
that the law of the land permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law."8 1 With the law of the
Due Process Clause as undeveloped as it was at the time, the meaning of
the phrase was not readily apparent, and it was too general to provide
much guidance to an attorney in Robinson's position.
The Canons governing the actions of attorneys in the general field of
litigation were more specific, but gave little meaningful direction on the
four procedural questions in Nix. Those Canons urged that candor
should characterize the conduct of all lawyers toward courts, and that
the lawyer, not the client, is ultimately responsible for questionable suits
and defenses. 82 Canon Twenty-Four stated the principle that no client
78. D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 180 (1973).
79. See, e.g., MELLINKOFF, supra note 78, at 171-74 (discussing D. HOFFMAN, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 744 (2d ed.
1836)); G. SHARSWOOD, A COMPENDIUM OF LECTURES ON THE AIMS AND DUTIES OF THE
PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1854); G. WARVELLE, ESSAYS IN LEGAL ETHICS (1902).
80. See, eg., MELLINKOFF, supra note 78, at 257-59 (discussing the false expression of
belief in a client's case).
81. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 5 (1908).
82. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 22 (commands candor) and Canon
31 (fixes responsibility for questionable claims and defenses).
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has a right to demand that- an attorney do anything "repugnant to his
own sense of honor and propriety." Canon Sixteen expanded on that
principle and directed an attorney to use "his best efforts" to restrain and
prevent a client from doing anything unethical, particularly in regards to
court proceedings. If the client maintained an unethical intention, the
attorney was required to "terminate their relation. ' s3 Withdrawal in
such circumstances was also authorized in the Canon that otherwise limited the circumstances in which an attorney could voluntarily withdraw
from employment by a client."4
The general Canons that established ethical obligations for attorneys
in any form of practice, including office consultation, gave the most direct guidance on the procedural questions addressed in Nix. First, Canon Fifteen prohibited attorneys from violating any law in the course of
employment by the client, a prohibition which apparently included statutes making subornation of perjury a crime.8" When perjury occurred,
counsel was directed to "bring the matter to the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities."8 6 This special duty was also indicated by the general
duty to notify an injured party and his or her counsel, if necessary to
rectify any "fraud or deception . . . unjustly imposed upon the
court .... ,s The attorney's duty of confidentiality as set out in the Canons presented little difficulty to an attorney with, an obligation to report
a client's perjury, because Canon Thirty-seven specifically excluded the
announced intention to commit a crime from those client confidences an
attorney was bound to respect.8 8
Finally, the Canons provided rather clear direction on the type of
admonitions that could properly be used by an attorney to dissuade a
client from perjury. In Canon Thirty-Two, an attorney was urged to give
"advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking exact
compliance with the strictest principles of moral law."8 9 The type of
strong warning given by Robinson to Whiteside would have been generABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 16.
84. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 44 establishes that an attorney may
83.

not terminate an employment relationship except for "good cause." The Canon generally defines the term to cover situations in which the client insists upon "an unjust or immoral course
in the conduct of his case."
85. See supra text accompanying notes 69-76.
86. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 29.
87. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 41. While this Canon speaks of

informing the opposing party and Canon 29 specifies that the authorities be notified in the
event that an attorney discovers perjury, the practical difference appears to be nil. The opposing party would notify authorities of perjury causing that party harm so that official steps to
undo the effects of the perjury would be undertaken.
88.

ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 37.

89. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Canon 32.
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ally authorized under this provision. Robinson's statement that he
would tell the judge about Whiteside's perjury would also have been required under the Canon which established the duty of an attorney to
inform the authorities about perjury that has been committed. Finally,
Robinson would also have been free to testify against Whiteside without
violating the attorney's obligation of confidentiality, because the announced intention to commit the crime of perjury was outside the scope
of that obligation.9 0
The Canons were clearly framed with the general idea in mind that
the officer of the court role was the proper model for the behavior of all
attorneys. The obligation to prevent successful perjury from occurring
was explicit, and the client's interests were unambiguously subject to sacrifice in order to accomplish the goals of preventing fraud upon the court
and detecting perjured testimony.
2. The Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
In 1969, the ABA promulgated a second set of standards of professional behavior for state adoption. The 1969 standards were titled the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility and are usually referred to as
the Code. The Code was adopted in all states except California, and the
legal profession in a large majority of states is still governed by the
Code. 9 1
The Code is divided into nine basic sections, which are referred to as
canons. Each canon begins with a Canon, an extremely general statement of an attorney's duty in regard to a particular subject.92 Each section or canon contains a number of Disciplinary Rules, or DR's, which
90. Note that the announced intention to commit a crime is also excluded from the protection of the attorney-client privilege under proposed FED. R. EVID. 503(d)(1). There is a
slight point of interpretation to be addressed in that the exception applies by its terms in situations in which the "services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit a ... crime." It might be argued, although not persuasively, that the services of an
attorney in Robinson's position were obtained to assist Whiteside in defending against a murder charge, and making such a defense is not a crime. However, the exception must be read to
be broad enough to cover situations in which the general object of the employment is legal, but
certain steps or aspects of the employment involve the commission of a crime, such as perjury.
91. At this writing, only eleven states have replaced the Code with the Model Rules of

Professional Conduct, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 111-1 12. In California, the
Code heavily influenced that state's disciplinary standards. See California Rules of Professional Conduct. The California State Supreme Court adopts the state's Rules of Professional
Conduct which are usually recommended to that court by the California State Bar Association. The other collection of standards governing the conduct of California lawyers is the State
Bar Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-6172 (West 1983).
92. See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1: A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession (1981).
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constitute mandatory rules of behavior that must be followed by attorneys to avoid discipline. The DR's provide general guidance on those
points of professional ethics on which consensus has been reached, such
as: an attorney should never knowingly use perjured testimony (or any
false evidence) and an attorney should withdraw if continued employment will result in a violation of any of the DR's, including the DR forbidding the use of perjured testimony.9 3 The DR's in each canon are
preceded by a number of statements known as Ethical Considerations,
which are designed to assist state disciplinary bodies in interpreting the
DR's that follow. The Ethical Considerations contain general statements
of ABA policy and illustrative examples of applications of the relevant
DR's.
Perhaps the most significant difference between the Canons and the
1969 Code is that the duty to preserve client confidences in the Code is
broader than the confidentiality obligation contained in the Canons. 94
As originally adopted in 1969, the Code required an attorney to report
any fraud perpetrated by his or her client "upon a person or tribunal" in
the course of the representation. 95 While this requirement is not quite as
broad as the duty contained in the Canons, the 1969 version of DR 7102(B)(1) clearly commanded attorneys to report client perjury without
regard for the attorney's duty of confidentiality set forth in DR 4-101.96
In 1974, the ABA amended DR 7-102(B)(1) by eliminating the duty
to report "when the information [which the attorney must reveal to the
93. DR 7-102(A)(4) prohibits the use of perjured testimony and DR 2-110(B)(2) requires
withdrawal from employment if the violation of a DR is going to be required by a client.
94. As was the case under Canon 37 (see supra text accompanying note 88), DR 4-101(A)
and (B) require an attorney to hold all information in confidence that would be protected by
the attorney-client privilege from being revealed in court. However, 4-101(A) and (B) also
require an attorney to hold in confidence any other information gained in the professional
relationship if the disclosure of it would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client. Thus,
the general duty of confidentiality in the Code applies to the announced intent to commit a
crime (including that of perjury), while the duty of confidentiality would not apply to such
information under Canon 37. See supra text accompanying note 88.
95. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1). As the DR read
upon adoption in 1970, the text stopped with the second use of the word "tribunal". The
privileged communication exception provision was added in 1974. See infra text accompanying note 97.
96. Canon 41 established the duty of an attorney to report all frauds and deceptions imposed "upon the court or a party" including those frauds and deceptions perpetrated by his or
her client at any time. DR 7-102(B)(1) applies only to frauds perpetrated "during the course
of [the attorney's] representation [of the client]." See discussion of Canon 41, supra note 87.
Thus Canon 41 had a broader scope than DR 7-102(B)(1). The duty to report frauds under
the 1969 version of DR 7-102(B)(1) did not conflict with the duty of confidentiality established
in DR 4-101. The latter DR provides a general exception to the duty of confidentiality when
an attorney is permitted to disclose information under another Disciplinary Rule. Since DR 7102(B)(1) required disclosure of fraud, a fortiori the RULE "permitted" such disclosure.
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defrauded person or tribunal] is protected as a privileged communication."' 97 Since the attorney-client evidentiary privilege does not apply in
situations where the client seeks the services of an attorney to aid in the
commission of a crime, the 1974 amendment on its face would not have
effectively eliminated an attorney's duty to inform a court of perjury. 98
However, the ABA issued a Formal Opinion in 1975 stating that the
word "privileged" in the 1974 proviso to DR 7-102(B)(1) included not
only the evidentiary concept of the attorney-client privilege, but also encompassed all information shielded under the attorney's duty of confidentiality in DR 4-101. 9
For all practical purposes, the 1975 Formal Opinion completely
eliminated any reporting obligation of attorneys due to the extent of the
duty of confidentiality. Thus, the Code with the 1974 Version of DR 7102(B)(1), prohibits attorneys from reporting client perjury, and the alter
ego advocate role concept is thereby adopted in the Code." °°
3. Proposed CriminalJustice Standard 4-7.7
In 1971, the American Bar Association approved a draft of a detailed procedure for criminal defense attorneys to follow when confronted with a perjury-intending client. Eight years after the ABA
formally approved an elaborate set of Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, however, the House of Delegates was not
asked to approve Proposed Standard 4-7.7, which closely followed the
1971 draft procedure. 0 1
As will be discussed below, the approach to the problem of client
10 2
perjury contained in 4-7.7 differs from that in the 1983 Model Rules.
However the terms of 4-7.7 and its similar predecessor provided the basis
for judicial consideration of client perjury for the last fifteen years. Standard 4-7.7 represents an energetic attempt to supply a cohesive procedure sorely needed by the profession, given the fragmentary and
97. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1).
98. See proposed FED. R. EVID., supra note 77, 503(d)(1).
99. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 341 (1975).

100. Oddly enough, when perjury, or "fraud on the tribunal" has been committed by someone other than the attorney's client, there is an absolute duty to report it to the court under
DR 7-102(B)(2). Nothing in this DR provides an exception from the duty to inform in order to
protect client confidences. Perhaps this is just an oversight on the part of the ABA drafters,
who left the original language of the 1969 version of DR 7-102(B)(2) intact, while drastically
changing the language in DR 7-102(B)(1) in 1974. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
101. See ABA Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice, footnote to Standard
4-7.7. Proposed Standard 4-7.7 is discussed in Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 996 n.6.

102. See infra text accompanying notes 111-112.

468

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 13:443

contradictory provisions in the 1974 Code. 10 3 The standard is animated
by a conception of the role of the criminal defense attorney very close to
that which appears to lie behind the 1974 Code-the criminal defense
lawyer should assume an alter ego advocate role.
Standard 4-7.7 is explicit on the first attorney-client relationship
procedural question-when does an attorney have a duty to act. An attorney is instructed to take action to prevent client perjury when (1) the
client has admitted facts establishing guilt to the attorney, and (2) the
attorney's independent investigation establishes that the client's admissions are true."°4 As to the second question, concerning the admonitions
an attorney can make to his or her client to dissuade the client from
intended perjury, the Standard is vague. It states only that counsel
should "strongly discourage" the client from taking the stand and com10 5
mitting perjury.
103. Proposed Standard 4-7.7 of the Standards Relating to the Admin. of Criminal Justice
provides in full:
(a) If the defendant has admitted to defense counsel facts which establish guilt
and counsel's independent investigation established that the admissions are true but
the defendant insists on the right to trial, counsel must strongly discourage the defendant against taking the witness stand to testify perjuriously.
(b) If, in advance of trial, the defendant insists that he or she will take the stand
to testify perjuriously, the lawyer may withdraw from the case, if that is feasible,
seeking leave of the court if necessary, but the court should not be advised of the
lawyer's reason for seeking to do so.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the court,
or if the situation arises immediately preceding trial or during the trial and the defendant insists upon testifying perjuriously in his or her own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or use the perjured testimony.
Before the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer should make
a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer
may identify the witness as the defendant and may ask appropriate questions of the
defendant when it is believed that the defendant's answers will not be perjurious. As
to matters for which it is believed the defendant will offer perjurious testimony, the
lawyer should seek to avoid direct examination of the defendant in the conventional
manner; instead, the lawyer should ask the defendant if he or she wishes to make any
additional statement concerning the case to the trier or triers of the facts. A lawyer
may not later argue the defendant's known false version of facts to the jury as worthy
of belief, and may not recite or rely upon the false testimony in his or her closing
argument.

T. MORGAN

AND R. ROTUNDA, 1985 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 252-53 (1985) (hereinafter cited as Proposed Standard 4-7.7).

104. Proposed Standard 4-7.7(a), supra note 103. It is mysterious why the guilt of the
client must be established by the admissions. The relevant concern would seem to be whether
the client's admissions have established that the client now intends to commit perjury as to any
relevant fact. Note that under the Standard's position on when an attorney's duty to take
action to prevent perjury arises, Robinson would have had no duty to attempt to dissuade
Whiteside not to commit perjury, as Whiteside had not admitted facts showing that he was
guilty of first degree murder to his counsel. Nix, 106 S. Ct. at 991-92.
105. Proposed Standard 4-7.7(a), supra note 103.
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If the attempted dissuasion is unsuccessful, the third procedural
question is raised. On this point, 4-7.7 is elaborate. The attorney should
request leave to withdraw from the case, without giving the reason for
the request.10 6 From the reported cases it would appear that the conventional "reason" given to the court in such situations is that there are
"irreconcilable differences" between the attorney and the client.' °7 In
the common situation in which the public treasury is paying for the representation of the accused, the client's failure to pay attorneys fees is
eliminated as a reason for "irreconcilable differences." It is therefore
likely that a judge given this reason for withdrawal by a publicly financed
defense counsel will immediately suspect a disagreement between client
and counsel concerning intended false testimony or other false evidence.
If leave for withdrawal is granted, 4-7.7 has nothing more to say
concerning the attorney's conduct. It should be noted that once the attorney withdraws, it is very likely that the next counsel to represent the
defendant will not be told the facts that convinced the withdrawing attorney that the testimony the client intends to give is perjurious. Thus,
under the 4-7.7 procedures, granting withdrawal motions probably
would increase the amount of perjury elicited in court by unknowing
attorneys.
If the trial court denies the request to withdraw, the Standard offers
a detailed procedure to be followed.1"' The general guideline furnished
by the Standard is that it is "unprofessional conduct" for an attorney to
"lend aid to the perjury" or use the perjurious testimony in any way.
Specifically, defense counsel is instructed to initially make a record, out
of the presence of the judge and jury, of the fact that his or her client is
testifying against the advice of counsel. After conducting a normal examination of the defendant on all subjects on which no perjury is anticipated, the attorney should ask the client if he or she has any additional
statement to make. The perjured testimony may not be argued to the
jury or relied upon in counsel's closing.argument. This procedure obviously has at least one significant fault. The judge, and perhaps some
sophisticated jurors, will sense the import of counsel's seeming "abandonment" of the defendant in the midst of his or her testimony. 0 9
106. Proposed Standard 4-7.7(b), supra note 103.
107. See People v. Schultheis, 638 P.2d 8, 15 (Colo. 1981); State v. Lee, 142 Ariz. 210, 220,
689 P.2d 153, 163 (1984).
108. The remainder of this paragraph describes the procedure outlined in Standard 47.7(c). See Proposed Standard 4-7.7, supra note 103.
109. Another possible flaw in the recommended procedure is that asking the client for "any
additional statement" may be objectionable because it calls for testimony in narrative form.
See Lawyer's Trilemma, supra note 8, at 29. Note, however, that narrative testimony may be
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On the fourth procedural question, concerning an attorney's obligation after perjury has been committed by the client (or former client if
the request for leave to withdraw has been granted), the language of the
Standard is silent. However, the implication is obvious. It would make
little sense for the attorney to follow the awkward procedures prescribed,
only to subsequently inform the court of the fact that the client (or former client) has committed perjury. 11 0 The Standard appears to be quite
consistent with the 1974 version of DR 7-102(B)(1) on this point.
Although the difficulties and awkwardness with the 4-7.7 procedures are clear, there is no solution to the question of attorney response
to intended client perjury that will not, to some degree, sacrifice interests
that are worthy of consideration. The main point regarding 4-7.7 is that
it constitutes a clear and rather uncompromised attempt to give guidance
to the practicing bar for responding to an extremely difficult situation.
The contrast with the 1974 Code provisions on this point is striking.
There is also a marked contrast between the 1974 Code provisions on the
client perjury problem and those contained in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983.
4.

The Model Rules of Professional Conduct

While the Code contained contradictory provisions, and, after 1974,
effectively prohibited an attorney from reporting client perjury, the
Model Rules of 1983 explicitly required "reasonable remedial measures"
when a client has committed perjury, regardless of the duty of confidentiality.1 11 The duty of confidentiality is expressed in extremely broad
terms in Model Rule 1.6, but the language of Rule 3.3 and the comments
to the Rule containing the duty of confidentiality make it clear that an
attorney must take measures to remedy the client perjury regardless of
the confidentiality obligation.11 2 Thus, the drafters of the Model Rules
removed the major restriction, imposed in the 1974 Code, on an attorney's obligation to the court to prevent fraud in proceedings.
However, as the comments to Model Rule 3.3 make clear, the requirement that an attorney take reasonable remedial measures is not an
automatic requirement to report client perjury to the court. In paragraph eleven of the comments, the drafters state that an attorney discovadmitted at the discretion of the trial court. FED. R. EVID. 611; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 611[01], at 611-17 (1985).
110. Wolfram, supra note 14, at 866 n. 225.
111.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4).

112. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) and 3.3(b), comments to
Rule 3.3 entitled "False Evidence" and "Perjury by a Criminal Defendant," and comment to
Rule 1.6 entitled "Disclosures Otherwise Required or Authorized."
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ering client perjury should first remonstrate with the client to remedy the
situation. If that is unavailing, the attorney should seek to withdraw
from the case, and, if withdrawal is either denied or "will not remedy the
situation," the attorney should report the perjury to the court.
It is hard to imagine situations in which counsel's withdrawal, of
itself, will remedy the harm caused by perjured testimony. Thus, it
would appear that reporting will be required under Rule 3.3 in almost all
cases of client perjury. However, paragraph twelve of the comments to
Rule 3.3 specifically exempts an attorney from the obligation to report
client perjury in criminal prosecutions, if the controlling case law in the
court in which the perjury occurs precludes the attorney from reporting
in order to protect the client's constitutional rights.
Although somewhat restrained by the language of the comments to
Rule 3.3, the Model Rules clearly opt toward the officer of the court role
for the trial advocate in the criminal prosecution setting. The Nix decision has endorsed this concept of the lawyer's role and removed some of
the uncertainty concerning the constitutionality of the Model Rules governing criminal defense counsel.
C.

Constitutional Decisions Prior to Nix v. Whiteside

The concern over constitutional constraints expressed in the comment to Model Rule 3.3 was well taken. By 1983, a number of federal
circuit courts had shown concern and confusion over the constitutional
implications of a criminal defense attorney's response to client perjury.
While the Supreme Court had never specifically decided whether a defendant enjoys a right to testify in his or her own behalf under the Due
Process Clause, many circuit courts had held that such a constitutional
right did exist.11 This right, and the sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel in defending against a criminal prosecution, could
clearly be affected by the response of a defense counsel confronted by
114
client perjury or a client's intention to commit perjury.
113. United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Bifield,
702 F.2d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 1983).
114. Some of the most interesting speculation on the subject of the consitutional implications of an attorney's response to client perjury or the threat thereof can be found in Brazil,
UnanticipatedClient Perjury and the Collision of Rules ofEthics, Evidence, and Constitutional

Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1979). The author discussed the possible implications of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination on the duty of defense counsel to report perjury. This view appears to be groundless after Nix, which omits any consideration of the
privilege in discussing the duty of counsel to report a client perjury. See infra text accompanying notes 150-153.
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Since 1963, it has been clear that anyone prosecuted for a crime
carrying a penalty of possible imprisonment has the right to effective
assistance of counsel in defending against the charge, at state expense if
necessary. 115 Just what attributes of an attorney are guaranteed under
the effective assistance of counsel rubric has remained generally unspecified, although the Court has held that effective assistance of counsel does
not require that the defense attorney and his or her client enjoy a "mean16
ingful relationship" marked by trust and confidence.'
In the 1984 decision of Strickland v. Washington," 7 the Court for
the first time addressed the general concept of attorney error and the
Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant in a criminal action. The
Court established that the level of attorney performance guaranteed a
criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment was the conduct of a
defense in a manner that was reasonably effective and not "outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance." 1 8 This required a
defense without errors "so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."' " 9
The Court mentioned "prevailing norms of practice" such as ABA standards as nonbinding guides to determining "reasonable effectiveness" in
specific cases. 120
Prior to Nix, the United States Supreme Court had not considered
specific actions or procedures that a defendant might have a constitutionally protected right to expect from a defense attorney. However, the
Court had taken a definite stand against perjury. In United States v.
Grayson, 2 ' the Court held that a judge violated no constitutional right of
the defendant by enhancing the sentence given after conviction because
the judge believed that the defendant had committed perjury during his
testimony. The Court's attitude toward perjury was in keeping with its
rejection of the "sporting theory" expressed by Justice Douglas in Brady
v. Maryland. 22 Not surprisingly, the Court has also held that a convic115. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right to counsel applies only in
those prosecutions in which loss of liberty is a possibility. Argersinger v. Hanmlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972).
116. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).

117. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
118. Id. at 690.

119. Id. at 687.
120. Id. at 688.

121. 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978).
122. 373 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1963). In Brady, the Court required the prosecution to turn over
all exculpatory evidence to the defendant in order to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 84-86. This
requirement of prosecutors emanates from the Due Process Clause. Following Brady, DR 7103(B) made this duty the subject of bar discipline. In the latest professional standards, Model
Rule 3.8(d) also imposes this duty on the prosecutor as a professional obligation.
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tion obtained in a trial in which perjured testimony was given by a prosecution witness violated the due process rights of
the defendant, regardless
123
result.
trial
the
on
perjury
the
of
effect
of the
Over the last ten years, five federal circuit courts have examined the
constitutional issues presented when court-appointed counsel react to
what they see as intended or accomplished perjury of their clients, or of
witnesses friendly to their clients. The results have been mixed: three
circuits held the attorneys' reactions violated the constitutional rights of
the client, and two circuits found the actions of the attorneys involved to
be constitutionally permissible.
The doctrinal views adopted by these courts have also been mixed,
although certain common elements of analysis can be found. The
Supreme Court's announcement that there is no constitutional right to
commit perjury was invoked in almost every decision. Another constant
was the acceptance of the constitutionality of defense counsel admonishing the perjury-intending client to renounce the intention to perjure and
of defense counsel requesting withdrawal if the admonition failed. Beyond these points of agreement the cases were in disarray, and the Nix
decision does not remove all of the points of conflict and confusion.
Most of the decisions discuss Standard 4-7.7, several of the decisions accept the idea that a right to testify in one's own behalf is implicit in the
right to due process, and almost all of the decisions consider the constitutional implications of the attorney's actions in the terms of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.
Where the actions of defense counsel effectively revealed to the fact
finder in the proceeding that counsel believed perjury was intended prior
to its commission, courts have held that the defendant's due process and
sixth amendment rights were violated. Thus, in Lowery v. Cardwell 124,
the Ninth Circuit held that counsel, in stopping direct examination of her
client and immediately asking the court for permission to withdraw from
the case, violated the defendant's right to a fair trial because the court,
sitting without a jury, was the finder of fact. 125 The abrupt way in which
counsel reacted to what was apparently unanticipated perjury indicated
to the judge, a sophisticated fact finder, that counsel believed the testimony was false. However, the court generally approved the 4-7.7 proce126
dure in cases that were being tried before a jury.
123. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
124. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
125. IM at 731.
126. In Lowery, the 4-7.7 procedure was followed as much as possible: counsel sought
withdrawal and refused to give a reason. Upon denial of the request to withdraw, the attorney
did not continue to question the witness-defendant and did not argue from the defendant's
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In United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson,12 7 the Third Circuit reversed a conviction on the basis that the defense attorney did not provide
effective assistance of counsel. At the attorney's request, the trial court
ruled that if the defendant insisted on testifying, the defense counsel
would be permitted to withdraw and the defendant would have to represent himself in the proceeding. Contrary to the procedure of Standard 47.7, defense counsel informed the judge of her belief that the defendant
intended to perjure himself on the stand and therefore requested permission to withdraw. More importantly, the circuit court found that the
attorney did not have an adequate basis for forming the belief that the
client intended to commit perjury.12 8 The court in dicta indicated that if
counsel had a firm factual basis for believing that her client intended
perjury, the proper course was for her to seek withdrawal without discussing the reason, and the judge should respond by appointing a re12 9
placement counsel for the defendant.
When these decisions are considered with Whiteside v. Scurr, a general conception of the proper role of a defense attorney arises. The
Eighth Circuit's decision was predicated on the idea that a criminal defense lawyer must at least passively cooperate if the client insists on committing perjury, while Lowery is apparently premised on the idea that if a
criminal prosecution is tried before a court without a jury, defense counsel should cooperate in the perjury by putting the client on and conducting the examination and later argument so that the judge is not made
aware of counsel's doubts about his or her client's credibility. The role
concept adopted by these courts is obviously that of the alter ego advocate, whose duties toward the court are extremely limited.
The facts in Wilcox are rather extreme on the point of attorney misconduct: counsel actually told the judge of her doubts as to client credibility prior to the testimony, taking this action on the basis of what
testimony in her closing argument. Id. at 729. These actions are all recommended under 47.7, although the Standard is directed to situations in which the defendant announces the
intent to commit perjury to his or her attorney prior to taking the stand, whereas this case
presents what appears to be unanticipated perjury. See Proposed Standard 4-7.7, supra note
103.
127. 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1977).
128. In Wilcox, counsel was unable to recall the basis for her conviction that appellee
would perjure himself, and the court noted that there was no record evidence indicating that
the defendant intended to commit perjury. Id. at 121-22.
129. This procedure suffers from the same aura of unreality as Standard 4-7.7, because the

judge will often immediately surmise the reason for a court-appointed counsel's request to
withdraw. Wilcox, 555 F.2d at 122. See supra text accompanying notes 107-108. Also, the

next court-appointed counsel will probably end up unknowingly putting on the perjured testimony in the normal manner if the defendant learns to hide the true story after having gone

through the conferences leading up to the withdrawal request by the first attorney.
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apparently was no more than a general knowledge of the client from past
representation. Thus, it may be unproductive to speculate on the conception of the proper role for defense counsel held by the reviewing court.
However, the court indicated a "proper" procedure under which the perjury-intending defendant will obtain a new attorney. As a practical matter this will give a defendant the opportunity in many cases to have his or
her perjured testimony placed before the trier of fact with the full participation of the innocent replacement counsel.
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Curtis 130 adopted an officer
of the court role concept, and the decision strongly contrasts with Wilcox. In Curtis, defense counsel, on the basis of substantial investigation
and contradictory statements by the client, formed the opinion that his
client intended to commit perjury. Counsel thereafter refused to put the
defendant on the stand. The reviewing court recognized a constitutional
right of the defendant to testify in his own behalf, but qualified that right
to apply only to truthful testimony. Thus, although counsel refused to
permit the defendant to take the stand, the court held no constitutional
rights of the latter were infringed.
While the Curtis court specifically noted the verbatim language of
Standard 4-7.7, it declined to comment on whether those actions of counsel that conflicted with the Standard should subject him to professional
discipline. 3 However, it logically follows from the court's holding that
no professional discipline should be invoked. First, perjury would have
occurred had the defendant not been kept off the stand. Second, the defendant's constitutional rights were unaffected by the refusal of his counsel to permit the testimony. Lastly, the Code instructs attorneys never to
knowingly use false evidence of any kind, the purpose being to protect
court processes from fraud and debasement.13 2
The Curtis approach to client perjury is of a piece with that shown
in the Fifth Circuit decision in McKissick v. United States. 33 In McKissick, counsel reported to the court that his client had admitted committing perjury during the previous day's testimony, and a mistrial was
declared. Holding that the mistrial order was correct and no double
jeopardy attached to the first trial, the court found no violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights and praised the defense attorney for
protecting the integrity of the court by reporting the perjury
130. 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir. 1984).
131. Id. at 1076 n.4.
132. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4).
133. 398 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1968). The case was previously reviewed and remanded in
McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967).
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Thus, the circuit court decisions prior to Nix split sharply on the
conception of a criminal defense attorney's proper role in the client perjury context. Although Lowery, Wilcox and Whiteside v. Scurr are influenced in varying degrees by the alter ego advocate concept, Curtis and
McKissick are only consistent with the officer of the court model.
III.

The Supreme Court Decision in Nix v. Whiteside

A. Opinions of the Court
The majority opinion in Nix v. Whiteside takes an unequivocal position on the proper role of the criminal defense attorney. 135 Counsel in
such situations is at all times "an officer of the court."' 3 6 As such, he or
she is "a key component of a system of justice, dedicated to a search for
truth."'137 The duty of an attorney to advocate a client's cause "is limited
to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very nature of a trial as
a search for truth". 138 An attorney may not knowingly be a party 1 to
39
perjury, or in any way give aid to the presentation of such testimony.
Thus the language of the majority, in no uncertain terms, embraces the
officer of the court role.
More important than the Court's rhetoric is the unqualified announcement of a criminal defense attorney's duty to report known perjury committed by a client."4 This "direction" on proper procedure for
attorneys to follow reinforces and gives meaning to the Court's decision
that the proper role of a criminal defense counsel is distinctly different
from that of an alter ego advocate.
The majority opinion makes three determinations of constitutional
doctrine, all of which are generally accepted by the concurring opinion of
Justice Blackmun. The first determination is that the "prejudice" requirement in Strickland cannot be met on the basis of the presumption
134. 398 F.2d at 343. In the previous review, the court stated that "[t]he attorney not only
could, but was obligated to, make such disclosure to the court as necessary to withdraw the
perjured testimony from the consideration of the jury." 379 F.2d at 761.
135. 106 S.Ct. 988 (1986). The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Burger who
was joined by Justices White, Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor. The concurring opinion was
written by Justice Blackmun and was signed by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Stevens each wrote short statements explaining why they joined the concurring opinion.

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

106 S.Ct. at 998.
Id.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id. at 995-96.
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adopted by the Eighth Circuit.14 1 The position in both opinions is that
there was no conflict between Whiteside and Robinson in the same sense
as the term has been used to describe situations in which an attorney
attempts to represent two defendants in a criminal prosecution whose
legal interests are contradictory.14 2 The Eighth Circuit's contrary assertion was clearly erroneous. Since Whiteside had no legitimate interest in
giving perjurious testimony, there could be no "conflict" under the
Strickland prejudice test between the defendant's desires on this point
and the ethical obligations of Robinson to avoid suborning perjury. 14 3
On this issue, the conception of the proper role for the criminal defense attorney adopted expressly in the majority opinion, and by implication in the concurrence, is crucial. If the officer of the court role is
accepted, as both opinions do, there can never be a conflict between a
client and an attorney who is fulfilling that role by preventing the disfigurement of a trial through the introduction of perjured testimony. If the
alter ego advocate conception is adopted, as in the opinion of the Eighth
Circuit, a disagreement between attorney and client over such a matter
can logically be deemed a conflict that seriously impairs the attorney's
assistance as counsel.
Pursuing its analysis of this point, the majority notes that the
Eighth Circuit's "conflict" decision would have grave consequences for
the criminal justice system, since every defendant found guilty could appeal on the ground, real or fanciful, that his or her attorney had not
presented the perjurious testimony that the defendant had desired to introduce.144 The concurring Justices announced an additional reason for
the determination of the conflict issue: in their view, dissuading Whiteside from giving perjurious testimony was a reasonable step to protect the
defendant's best interests, because the perjury would have been contradicted and, perhaps, detected. This might have led the jury to find him
145
guilty of first degree murder and the judge to enhance his sentence.
The concurrence speaks in terms specific to the facts of the case before it,
but the points made could be generalized to apply to any situation in
which a defendant's proposed perjury would, or might, be detected.
The opinions also agree on a second determination of constitutional
doctrine concerning the scope of a defendant's right to testify. Accepting
the assumption that the defendant's right to testify in his or her own
141. 106 S.Ct. at 999; id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
142. The decision establishing the presumption of prejudice warranting reversal under the
Strickland formulation is Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980). See supra note 141.
143. 106 S.Ct. at 999; id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 999.
145. Id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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behalf is of constitutional dimension, both opinions reject the argument
that the 6right includes the right to commit perjury during the test14

imony.

On the third issue of constitutional doctrine-whether a defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel includes the
right to an attorney's aid or passive assistance in committing perjurythe opinions agree that the answer is negative. The majority opinion
elaborates on the point, stating that as in the situation in which a defendant "informed his counsel that he was arranging to bribe or threaten
witnesses or members of the jury [the defendant] would have no 'right' to
insist on counsel's assistance or silence."14 7 The concurrence is also definite: ". . . Whiteside had no right to Robinson's help in presenting per'
jured testimony." 148
While the majority and concurring opinions agree that Robinson's
successful admonitions to Whiteside did not deprive the latter of any
constitutionally protected rights, the opinions significantly differ in one
major respect. The majority specifically endorses Robinson's performance in giving the admonitions. 14 9 The concurring opinion, on the other
hand, carefully bases its decision for reversal solely on the ground that
Whiteside had failed to show that Robinson's admonitions had
150
prejudiced any of the defendant's constitutional rights.
The threat, or statement, by Robinson that he would withdraw from
representing Whiteside unless the defendant abandoned his intent to
commit perjury was always noncontroversial, and the majority does not
discuss this admonition. Robinson's second admonition that he would
report the perjury to the court if his client testified falsely is expressly
approved by the majority opinion." 1 The opinion endorses the concept
146. Id. at 998; id. at 1004 (Blackmun, J., concurring). On the right to testify, Blackmun
and the signers of the concurring opinion state that the right to testify is protected by the
Sixth, Fourteenth, and possibly Fifth Amendments. Id. at 1004-05 n.5. The majority opinion
does not take this final step, but contains language that seems to imply that the Chief Justice
and the other four Justices are ready to accept the implications of previous decisions establishing the right as a constitutionally protected one. Id. at 993.
147. Id. at 998.
148. Id. at 1005 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 998-99.
150. Id. at 1006-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 998. The majority opinion quotes the language of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (1983) and finds that the comment "suggests that an

attorney's revelation of his client's perjury to the court is a professionally responsible and
acceptable response to the conduct of a client who has actuallly given perjured testimony."
106 S. Ct. at 996. The ABA amicus brief is briefly mentioned and its essence is stated to be
"that under no circumstance may a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a client's giving false testimony." Id. at 996.
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that reporting of client perjury is "professionally responsible and acceptable" on the basis of the commentary to the Model Rules
and the Ameri15 2
case.
the
in
filed
brief
amicus
Association's
Bar
can
The majority opinion also explicitly deals with the admonition that
caused the most difficulty for the Eighth Circuit, that Robinson "probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular [perjured]
testimony" of his client Whiteside. 15 3 The majority treats the admonition as a minor matter, reasonably interpreting it to mean that if Whiteside persisted in his desire to commit perjury, Robinson would withdraw
from the case and, if Whiteside then did commit perjury, Robinson
would testify as an impeaching witness. To the majority, the idea that
Robinson did not imply that he would testify against Whiteside while
still representing him removed any concern with the admonition. Others
in the profession might not be as sanguine. It might be argued, for instance, that it is a far less dramatic event for an attorney to report to the
judge the fact that his client has committed perjury, than for the attorney
to testify in open court against his former client. Certainly the Eighth
Circuit was of the opinion that this threat adversely and irreparably af4
fected the relationship between Whiteside and his counsel.1'
On the other hand, the majority obviously considers the threat to
testify no more significant than the report admonition. Since the latter is
clearly authorized in the majority's view, the former is also. Of course
after an attorney reports perjury by a present or former client, the attorney will be sought after by the prosecutor to testify in either a subsequent
perjury prosecution, or as an impeachment witness in the action in which
the perjury occurs.' 5 5 In most cases, the judge, upon learning of the perjury, will probably declare a mistrial, and the defendant will likely be
retried on the original charge. In the second trial, the client could not
152. Id. at 996.
153. Id. at 997 n.7.
154. Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 1984).
155. On this point, it should be noted that if the attorney who reports the perjury has
successfully moved to withdraw from representation prior to the trial in which the perjury
occurs, there would be less concern over the attorney's appearance in the trial as witness than
if the attorney was originally denied leave to withdraw, represented the client in the trial,
reported the client's perjury when it occurred, was allowed to withdraw and then testified for
the prosecution as an impeaching witness. The strong adverse effect that such a course of
events would have on a jury might well lead it not only to disregard the client's perjurious
testimony, but also to find all facts against the client on the ground that even the client's own
attorney had turned against the client. The majority opinion does not consider the variety of
situations in which a former attorney might be called upon to testify to impeach a former
client. Therefore, it is a likely assumption that the statement of the majority means that the
Court has no constitutional reservations about the former attorney impeachment testimony in
an action in which the attorney has not previously represented the client before the jury.
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bar the former attorney's testimony on the ground of the attorney-client
privilege, because the privilege does not apply when the client intends to
use the attorney's services to commit a crime. 5 6
The crucial difference between the majority and the concurring
opinions is that the majority specifically endorses the concept that a
criminal defense attorney has a professional duty to report perjury to the
court when his or her client commits it. 57 Although the American Bar
Association took contrasting positions on the issue in the 1969 Code and
the 1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1), the majority opinion notes that
the ABA's amicus brief takes the view "that under no circumstances may
a lawyer either advocate or passively tolerate a client's giving false testimony. ' The majority states that reporting a client's perjury "is wholly
consistent with.., the overwhelming majority of courts, and with codes
of professional ethics." '5 9 In view of the language in the 1974 version of
DR 7-102(B)(1), the equivocal statements in the comment to Model Rule
3.3, the clear implications of proposed Standard 4-7.7 and the previous
disarray of federal circuit courts, the Court's statement is perhaps questionable. 1" However, after Nix the way is now cleared for the "remedial
measures" command contained in Model Rule 3.3 to be fully operative in
all states adopting the recently promulgated Model Rules.
The basic position of the concurring opinion is that the majority
should not announce its approval of professional rules that require a
criminal defense attorney to report client perjury. 161 There appears to be
two grounds for the concurring opinion's objection. The first is that a
blanket rule on what constitutes a constitutionally permissible response
to a client's intention to commit perjury is an inappropriately broad approach to a question that "is likely to vary from case to case" due to a
"complex interaction of factors." '6 2 The relevant factors mentioned by
the concurrence are: the degree of certainty that perjury has occurred or
will occur; the stage of the proceedings at which the attorney discovers
his or her client's plan to commit perjury; and "the ways in which the
attorney may be able to dissuade his client."1 63 The concurring Justices
believe a blanket rule is inappropriate because it will force attorneys to
156. Cf proposed FED. R. EVID. 503, supra note 77.
157. 106 S. Ct. at 995-96 ("[T]he legal profession has accepted that... [there is a] special
duty of an attorney to prevent and disclose frauds upon the court .
.
158. Id. at 996.
159. Id. at 999 (footnote omitted).
160. See supra notes 96-100, 110, 112, 124-134, and accompanying text.
161. 106 S. Ct. at 1000, 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
163. Id.

Spring 1986]

THE LAWYER'S ROLE IN RESPONSE TO PERJURY

481

function as the judge or jury of their client's story. This, in turn, may
deprive the clients "of the zealous and loyal advocacy required by the
Sixth Amendment." 1
The second ground for the objection of the concurring opinion is
that only the courts and legislatures of individual states are empowered
to make the rules and regulations that govern the practice of law within
their borders. Announcements of preferred practice by the Court may
therefore constitute "unnecessary federal interference in a State's regulation of its bar." 6 ' Justice Blackmun and those who joined in the concurring opinion would avoid this interference by deciding the case wholly on
the basis that no prejudice under the Strickland standard has been
shown. 166
Both grounds of criticism of the majority opinion appear to be illfounded. As to the "blanket rule" criticism, the majority does not establish a rule forcing state disciplinary bodies to hold that failure to report
client perjury is unprofessional conduct. All the majority has said-and
all that the United States Supreme Court can say on such matters-is
that if a state adopts a reporting requirement, as in Model Rule 3.3(a)(4),
compliance with that requirement by criminal defense attorneys will not
deprive defendants of effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment. States, and states alone, have the power to enact and enforce such reporting requirements. Secondly, only a "blanket rule", actually a "blanket announcement", by the United States Supreme Court
can end the conflict between the federal circuit courts on the question of
lawyer response to client perjury and give the states a firm basis for writing disciplinary codes that can be promulgated with certainty of
constitutionality.
As to the concurrence's distress over a blanket rule in an area in
which a criminal defendant's rights may be prejudiced, it should be borne
in mind that in the protracted litigation at bar, all of the courts that
examined the matter found that Whiteside would have committed perjury had Robinson not given the admonitions he did. Where it is certain,
or as certain as possible given court procedures for ascertaining facts,
that perjury would occur or has occurred, a reporting requirement does
not seem harshly restrictive of the rights of defendants. Finally, the second objection of the concurring opinion, concerning federal interference,
is based upon an unspoken premise that state disciplinary bodies will
now feel compelled to adopt a reporting requirement because of what the
164. Id. at 1006 (footnote omitted).
165. Id. at 1006.
166. Id.
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majority opinion says. But, once again, the only bodies with the power
to promulgate and enforce disciplinary rules are the states, not the
United States Supreme Court. The majority opinion merely provides a
constitutional authorization to the states to require a provision for the
reporting of client perjury in their disciplinary codes if states wish to do
SO.
The short concurring statement by Justice Stevens points out a
troubling concern which is raised by the Nix decision: the uncertainty of
an attorney's determination that his or her client intends to give, or has
given, perjurious testimony. In the Justice's words, -[a] lawyer's certainty that a change in his client's recollection is a harbinger of intended
perjury-as well as judicial review of such apparent certainty-should be
tempered by the realization that, after reflection, the most honest witness
may recall (or sincerely believe he recalls) details that he previously overlooked." 16 In Nix, defense counsel Robinson had a client who contradicted himself at the last moment in a manner indicating a clear
fabrication of a new story. Independent investigation produced abundant evidence (three witnesses, a search after the event by police, and
counsel's own subsequent search) to convince an unbiased observer that
the client's new story was indeed false. What quantum of evidence short
of this will be sufficient to trigger procedures that an attorney is directed
to take in response to client perjury? Undoubtedly, future cases will raise
that question.
B.

The Four Procedural Issues

Reviewing both the majority and the concurring opinions on the
four controversial procedural issues that arise in connection with the
threat of client perjury reveals that Nix is indeed a major decision in a
previously confused field. On the first issue of when does an attorney
have a duty to act, neither opinion goes beyond expressing that the attorney in this case was justified in taking action.
With regard to the admonitions that an attorney can give to dissuade the perjury-intending client, those given by Robinson are now approved by five members of the majority as well as Justice Stevens in his
separate statement. 168 Thus, the threat or "admonition with a statement
of intent" by the attorney that he or she vill (1) withdraw, (2) report
perjury if it occurs, and (3) testify to impeach the perjuring defendant
after withdrawing, are all constitutionally acceptable. The concurrence
167. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
168. Id. at 999; id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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merely holds that the admonitions Robinson gave do not violate any con-

stitutionally protected right of a client who intended to commit perjury.
On the third issue of what attorney conduct is proper prior to the

perjurious testimony if the attorney's request to withdraw is not granted,
the concurrence is silent. The majority opinion indicates, at a minimum,
that the procedure in Proposed Standard 4-7.7 is constitutional. On this

point, it should be recalled that the majority opinion mentioned, without
disapproval, the Curtis decision, which specifically approved keeping a
perjury-intending client off the stand to prevent false testimony. By doing this, the majority may be indicating its constitutional approval of
more dramatic and aggressive procedures than those prescribed in Standard 4-7.7.169
Lastly, it is clear in both the majority and concurring opinions that
an attorney may report the fact that a client or former client has committed perjury after it has occurred. As to testifying against a former client
for purposes of impeachment or in a subsequent prosecution, the majority clearly believes it violates no constitutional rights, while the concurrence is silent on the matter.

Conclusion
The Nix decision is a major development in the jurisprudence of
lawyer ethics. The three issues of constitutional doctrine were decided in
a clearcut manner. Three of the four procedural questions for criminal
defense attorneys were addressed and definitively answered. These determinations all flow from a firm choice of the proper role to be played by a
criminal defense attorney-that of an officer of the court. The importance of the Nix decision is indicated by the questions it raises concerning
current professional standards and conduct. Those questions are numerous and some are of large significance.
It is now clear that those states that have adopted the 1974 version
of DR 7-102(B)(1) are not compelled by constitutional considerations to
keep the provision. Furthermore, the cautionary note in the comment to
Model Rule 3.3 regarding perjury by a criminal defendant can now be
either eliminated or altered to take into account the position of the Court
as announced in Nix. Finally, those states wishing to experiment with
dramatic requirements of attorneys responding to anticipated client perjury, may be encouraged to do so by the majority opinion's seeming acquiescence toward the opinion in United States v. Curtis.170 It is far from
169. The Court mentions United States v. Curtis, 106 S. Ct. at 996 n.6, and 999 n.8. For a
discussion of the Curtis decision, see supra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
170. Id. See supra text accompanying note 169.
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certain whether the Court, or even the signers of the majority opinion,
would approve the constitutionality of an attorney's decision to keep his
or her client off the stand to prevent perjury; but those states that may
wish to require such a procedure can be emboldened to do so on the basis
of Nix.
It is interesting to contemplate in this regard that the time may now
be at hand for a division of those rules of professional responsibility, having to do with client perjury, into one set for civil advocates and one set
for criminal advocates. Certainly, in civil trials there is no concern with
the Sixth Amendment as a technical matter.17 1 More importantly, the
concern over the force of the state being mustered against the individual
that animates our concerns regarding the Sixth Amendment is lacking in
most civil litigation. Thus, since the Nix decision strongly announces
that truth is the goal of the criminal adjudication process and follows this
announcement by approving the responses to intended client perjury
traced above, it is logical to assume that in civil litigation an attorney's
obligation to prevent perjury from occurring in the courtroom will be
even stronger. It is therefore quite probable that the Supreme Court
would allow for even more dramatic options for civil advocates in response to threatened client perjury.
Considering the options that criminal defense attorneys will now
have in determining how to respond to client perjury, along with the fact
that states may begin to require dramatic action on the part of attorneys
to stop client perjury or else face disciplinary action, the extreme importance of an attorney's determination that his or her client intends to commit perjury on the stand becomes clear. As stated above, Justice Stevens
is perceptive in pointing out the nature of the problem and the fact that it
172
will undoubtedly present difficulties in this area for years to come.
One commentator, writing after the Eighth Circuit Whiteside v. Scurr
decision, suggested an elaborate form of judicial hearing in which only
the defendant and his or her counsel, the judge and a court reporter
would be present for the purpose of determining if counsel's belief that
171. However, the Supreme Court has held that in certain civil cases involving government
benefit denials, the claimant has a right under the Due Process Clause to be represented by
counsel retained and paid by the claimant. See, eg., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270
(1970). Several circuit courts have also held that the Due Process Clause establishes a right to
access to and representation by privately retained counsel in a civil matter. See American
Airway Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Mosley v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 945 (5th Cir. 1981); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609
F.2d 1101, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980).
172. See supra text accompanying note 167.
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the defendant intends to commit perjury is well-founded.1 73 The procedure suggested would be useful to criminal defense attorneys, but would
burden already overworked criminal trial court judges. For this reason,
it is unlikely that the suggested procedure will be adopted on a large
scale.
It seems clear that Nix requires that the legal profession should take
steps to assure that criminal defendants are aware of the duties of counsel
in regard to client perjury. The author assumes that Professor Freedman's well known statements about the standard practice of criminal defense attorneys to present perjured testimony of a client is at least partly
true in many jurisdictions. 7 4 Therefore, following Nix, criminal defendant clients should receive a statement from their attorneys to the effect
that, if the jurisdiction imposes such a rule as a matter of professional
responsibility, the attorney has a duty to report perjury if it is committed
by the client or by any witness. Such a warning can be structured to
reassure the defendant to the greatest possible extent that the attorney
will give a full and vigorous defense, but that no perjury will be allowed
5
17
to go unreported to the court.

The giving of warnings or statements at the outset of an attorneyclient relationship, particularly when the counsel is one that is provided
by the state, may be difficult for the criminal defense bar to adjust to.
However, Professor Freedman tells us that this is the practice in Canada.' 76 A dramatic change of this type in the initial contact between a
criminal defense attorney and his or her client seems required by Nix,
and is at least in keeping with the dramatic sweep of the Court's work in
the Nix decision itself.

173. See Rieger, Client Perjury: 4 ProposedResolution of the Constitutionaland Ethical

Issues, 70 MINN. L. REV. 121 (1985).
174. Professor Freedman reports the results of a District of Columbia survey which found
that ninety-five percent of the attorneys surveyed would call a perjury-intending client to the
stand and ninety percent would question the perjury-intending client in the normal manner.
Lawyer's Trilemma, supra note 8, at 29.
175. A suggested statement is: "As your attorney I will present any and all truthful evidence in your behalf at the trial in your case, but I cannot present any testimony or other
evidence that I am convinced is not true. If I am convinced that anyone has actually committed perjury or presented false evidence at the trial, I must immediately report that fact to the
court."

176. Lawyer's Trilemma, supra note 8, at 29. For a more complete discussion, see Lefstein,
supra note 10, at 688.

